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AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO THE 
CREATION OF INNOVATION 
ECOSYSTEMS AND THE ROLE OF LAW 
Toshiyuki Kono* and Kazuaki Kagami** 
INTRODUCTION 
Innovation is considered a source of social development, and 
the promotion of innovation has been encouraged all over the world. 
The methods for which innovation can be achieved, however, have 
not been clearly identified. The concept of an “ecosystem” has recently 
emerged as a tool to illustrate the organizational aspects of innovation, 
but the conditions and mechanisms necessary to create and manage a 
successful innovation ecosystem remain unclear. 
Many countries, including Japan, have been trying to create an 
ecosystem similar to Silicon Valley by inviting and accumulating 
venture companies, research institutions, and universities, and by 
providing special measures for tax reduction, new funding schemes, 
and opening new facilities. However, one important aspect seems to 
have been overlooked: even if each player is innovative, if they do not 
create relationships that lead to innovations, the area as a whole cannot 
function as an innovation ecosystem. When an ecosystem is 
established, the conditions of its autonomous functioning are not 
automatically fulfilled. Hence, we are interested in the role of law, 
which might contribute to the development of these conditions. In 
particular, we will focus on a factor that would lead to the 
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establishment of innovation ecosystems and functions–we1 call it 
“mode,” which we understand as those factors that determine the 
direction of the player’s thinking and activities–and analyze the role of 
law to facilitate the sharing of modes by relevant players. 
To illustrate the goal of this article, let’s have a look at the Ohta 
Ward in Tokyo. In Ohta Ward, many diverse small and midsized 
companies have gathered and countless innovations are continuously 
created. In this area, a number of voluntary interactions among these 
companies take place. Furthermore, networks between these 
companies, research institutes and governmental agencies are well 
established. Importantly, in Ohta Ward, laws and rules have played a 
crucial role in establishing these networks and their management. An 
innovation ecosystem, along with the supporting infrastructure, is 
firmly established in Ohta Ward. The supporting infrastructure 
includes not only measures related to tax and finance, but also 
measures aimed at development and education of human resources, 
the supply of human resources into the ecosystem, support for 
matching players, and the reduction of friction related to the 
establishment of networks and their management. In short, various 
types of support focusing on specificities of the ecosystem are offered 
as institutional bases of this well-functioning ecosystem.2 
I. INNOVATION ECOSYSTEM AND THE ROLE OF LAW 
Many policymakers and other governmental authorities have 
focused on innovation. Various policy measures have been introduced 
and implemented to achieve innovation. Industrial policies, particularly 
centralized industrial policies, are often adopted by developing 
countries to “catch up” with developed countries.  Such policies are 
                                                 
 
1   This refers to the authors of the article and is used throughout this 
article.  
2   Chiiki ni okeru sangyō shūseki no keisei oyobi kaihatsu ni kansuru 
hōritsu shinki jigyō ritchi no sokushin o tsūjite,-tō [Act on Formation and 
Development of Regional Industrial Clusters through Promotion of Establishment 
of New Business Facilities, etc.], Act No. 40 of May 11, 2007 (Japan).  
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inadequate to create new technologies or ideas, or to develop new 
types of market. Instead, open and decentralized systems have recently 
been attracting the attention policymakers. This is the so-called 
“ecosystem.” 
We share the view that an ecosystem is one of the most 
important keys for innovation.3 Although a well-established and widely 
shared definition of the concept of an ecosystem does not yet exist, 
there is one shared understanding of the ecosystem:4 an organization 
or system where continuous and dynamic interactions among various 
players take place. Inherent in this definition is the idea that innovative 
outcomes cannot be obtained solely by a single “genius” individual or 
through a well-controlled and uni-linear evolution process. Rather, it 
is presumed that outcomes can be obtained as a result of multi-layered 
and voluntary interactions among various players.5 
Various policy measures have been implemented to promote 
innovations, including education policies to build the capacity of 
(potential) players in the ecosystem, cultural policies to promote 
innovation-oriented minds, intellectual property (IP) protections and 
tax policies to incentivize players, accumulation policies to raise the 
degree of players’ density, and subsidization policies. If these policy 
measures are successful, we would find a number of successful 
innovation ecosystems. The reality, however, is that despite many 
countries’ efforts to create a second Silicon Valley, their trials often 
yield unsuccessful results. This failure implies that the proper 
                                                 
 
3    See infra, note 6.  
4   Ecosystem is defined as “a multi-faceted and continual interaction 
among many aspects of our economy and society.” COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, 
INNOVATE AMERICA: NATIONAL INNOVATION INITIATIVE SUMMIT AND REPORT 
46 (2005).  
5   Regarding the evolution of the innovation concept, see RICHARD S. 
ROSENBLOOM & W. J. SPENCER, ENGINES OF INNOVATION: U.S. INDUSTRIAL 
RESEARCH AT THE END OF AN ERA (1996); ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL 
ADVANTAGE: CULTURES AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 
2-4 (1994) (comparing the independent firm-based system and the regional network-
based system, and asserting that the latter is more suitable). 
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understanding of the conditions and means necessary to create 
innovative ecosystems is still lacking.6 Why is that so? 
Our view is that policy measures have tended to target 
individual players themselves, and have failed to focus on the interaction 
between players. Even if excellent inventors, scholars, and entrepreneurs 
had populated a particular area, that area would not function well as an 
ecosystem if their interactions are ineffective. This idea reflects the 
shortcomings of previous research on ecosystems. It is a widely 
accepted belief that networking, communication, and collaboration are 
crucial, but how to facilitate this remains somewhat unclear. In short, 
the conditions of a well-functioning ecosystem has not been a topic of 
significant research. 
A key factor of a well-functioning ecosystem is the transaction 
costs caused by interactions among players.7 If transaction costs are 
high, interactions stagnate and the ecosystem remains ineffective. 
Further, if transaction costs matter, a law and economics approach 
might contribute to a clarification of the conditions. What can law do 
to promote interactions among players to create successful 
ecosystems? 
II. INNOVATION ECOSYSTEM AND MODE 
A.         Mode of Thinking and Behavior 
1. Generally recognized facts on innovation. – As already mentioned, 
innovations are created through interactions among multiple players 
under specific conditions. Such interactions can be affected by players’ 
internal nature and external environment. Players’ internal nature 
includes their knowledge, technical strength, passion, financial power, 
                                                 
 
6   In this context, see VICTOR W. HWANG & GREG HOROWITT, THE 
RAINFOREST: THE SECRET TO BUILDING THE NEXT SILICON VALLEY 304 (2012). 
7   For a discussion of transaction costs related to communications, see 
KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974); OLIVER E. 
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975).  
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way of thinking, and behavior. These elements of a players’ internal 
nature might be so player-specific that trying to determine an “average 
type” or “typical features” is unhelpful. In addition, these elements are 
usually formed within each player and become quasi-inherent. 
Therefore, a players’ internal nature is not easily changeable, and any 
change would require significant time and costs. 
A player’s external environment consists of external factors 
that influence his activities and performances, but that cannot be 
directly controlled by the player. Such factors include other players’ 
capabilities, types of players, or the density of players; funding systems; 
legal systems to protect contracts and/or property; the quality and 
quantity of lawyers; the credibility of the judicial system; macro-
economy and industrial structure; and consciousness on invention or 
entrepreneurship in society. 
Recognizing the fact that a number of factors affect 
innovations, we propose to focus on mode and to clarify the role of 
law in relation to mode because mode has been neglected in preceding 
scholarly works and has not been integrated into policy measures. 
2. The concept of mode and its functions. – In this paper, we 
understand mode as those factors that determine the direction of each 
player’s thinking and activities. This understanding of mode considers 
each player’s internal nature, but excludes purely innate factors such as 
IQ. Mode overlaps to some extent with personal character; however, 
mode is not identical to individual personality or philosophy, since 
personality and philosophy remain individual and internal. Instead, 
mode has such aspects that affect performances and outcomes of 
collaborative works with other players. Focus should be placed on such 
factors that can be acquired after birth and that are to some extent 
adjustable, such as language. Even if an individual is honest, 
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industrious and has good sense of humor, he cannot contribute to 
innovation if he does not have a mode to work with others. 
Mode is also closely linked to organizational cultures.8 Schein 
defines organizational cultures as: 
[A] pattern of shared basic assumptions that was 
learned by a group as it solved its problems of external 
adaptation and internal integration, that has worked 
well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to 
be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.9 
This definition is very close to our understanding of mode. 
However, mode in our view has a larger scope than that of 
organizational culture. Analysis of organizational cultures has often 
focused only on a single corporation, where the membership is fixed 
and has to follow the top-down authority. But mode is not limited to 
a single corporation. Mode as specific patterns of thinking and 
activities can apply to several organizations. In addition, even if an 
organization has a fluctuating membership, it could have its own 
mode. In addition, although studies on organizational cultures often 
presume that organizations can stand-alone without being affected by 
the outer world, this presumption seems unrealistic. Organizations 
cannot remain unaffected from interventions from outside, and mode 
is a useful tool to explain such situations. 
The mode of a community or a region may have similarities to 
socio-cultural norms. In preceding discussions on socio-cultural 
norms, socio-cultural norms tend to be understood as unilaterally 
                                                 
 
8   For a discussion of organizational culture, see TERRENCE DEAL & 
ALLAN KENNEDY, CORPORATE CULTURES: THE RITES AND RITUALS OF 
CORPORATE LIFE (1982); EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND 
LEADERSHIP (4th. ed. 2010). For an analysis from an economics perspective, see 
David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 90-143 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., 1990). 
9   SCHEIN, supra note 10, at 18. 
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influencing individuals or organizations, while feedback from 
individuals or organizations to such norms tends to be neglected. Even 
if such feedback would be taken into consideration, the self-
organizational nature of society is so emphasized that little attention is 
paid to the laws or powers that would intervene from outside of the 
society.10 In addition, such focus on the self-organizational nature 
might lead to an overlook the fact that societal relationships are more 
complex: such relationships include those between one society and 
other societies, between a society and a supra-society, or between a 
society and a partial society. 
The concept of mode helps us to pay due attention not only to 
each component of a society, i.e., mode of individuals, modes of 
organizations, inter-organizational relationships, and composite 
situations with these components,11 but also to relationships between 
a society and its outer world. 
Each player’s mode can be adapted to his external 
environment. Thus, his mode is influenced by the cultures, values, 
religions, norms, customs, and fashions of society as a whole. 
3. Interactions between different players with different modes result in high 
transaction costs. – If each player’s personal mode and the mode of his 
organization, community, and region (locale) are different, it is 
extremely difficult for such an organization or community to function 
as an ecosystem.12 In other words, members of an organization or 
community must share a specific mode. However, in order to foster 
innovation in an ecosystem, sharing specific modes by members will 
                                                 
 
10   See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS 
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).  
11   See Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 85 (1989); Jon 
Elster, Social Norms and Economic Theory, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 99 (1989); H. Peyton 
Young, The Economics of Conventions, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 105 (1996); Randal C. Picker, 
Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1225 (1997). 
12   See JOHN P. KOTTER & JAMES L. HESKETT, CORPORATE CULTURE 
AND PERFORMANCE (1992); JIM C. COLLINS & JERRY I. PORRAS, BUILT TO LAST: 
SUCCESSFUL HABITS OF VISIONARY COMPANIES (1994). 
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not suffice. Each member’s mode should be adapted to the external 
environment and should be consistent with the purpose of the 
community. For example, Toyota has not only been trying to let its 
employees share the same modes (organizational modes), irrespective 
of the location of subsidiaries, but has also been creating the modes in 
their supply chains (community modes). In Silicon Valley, there exists 
explicit or implicit modes to conduct business.13 To be noted here is 
the fact that a mode in an organization (e.g., Toyota) or in a region 
(e.g., Silicon Valley) is usually different from other organizations (e.g., 
General Motors) or regions (e.g., Ohta Ward). In other words, each 
ecosystem should have its own mode to function well. 
To create an open innovation ecosystem or meta-national 
ecosystem beyond one organization or one region, several 
communities with different modes or individuals from different 
communities must interact, for example, merger and acquisition 
between private companies; joint venture; collaboration between 
private company and university or private company and government. 
Also, with regard to merger and acquisition between private 
companies, many unconventional collaborations might occur, such as 
collaboration between manufacturer and distributor. This situation, 
however, would lead to constant conflicts of modes. Many failed 
merger and acquisition cases (e.g., Daimler Chrysler14  and AOL-Time 
Warner merger15) imply that, in such conflicted circumstances, no 
innovation ecosystems can be created. 
                                                 
 
13   For a discussion of the history and institutions of Silicon Valley, 
especially functions as ecosystem and relations to external environment, see MARTIN 
KENNEY, UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY: THE ANATOMY OF AN 
ENTREPRENEURIAL REGION (2000).  
14   Roberto A. Weber and Colin F. Camerer, Cultural Conflict and Merger 
Failure: An Experimental Approach, 49 MGMT. SCI. 400 (2003). 
15   Tim Arango, How the AOL-Time Warner Merger Went So Wrong, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/11/business/media/11merger.html?pagewante
d=all.  
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In a well-functioning innovation ecosystem, innovations are 
expected to occur autonomously and continuously. However, 
integrating (new) players with different modes into an ecosystem with 
its own mode may be difficult, since such integration could inevitably 
cause friction between the new players and the mode of the ecosystem. 
More difficult is the challenge of adjusting each community’s mode 
and non-community-members’ mode, because the mode of a 
community is usually so designed that the community functions well 
as an autonomous mechanism. Integration of such a mode and the 
mode of non-community-members would not occur autonomously. 
Hence, we need external interventions, such as law, to facilitate 
integration of different modes. 
Here, then, is the question we must answer: how should law be 
designed as a useful tool to adjust to conflicts of modes? Roughly 
speaking, there are two possible directions: (1) to introduce a unified 
mode, disregarding players’ different modes; and (2) to select 
appropriate modes on a case-by-case basis, maintaining the difference 
of modes. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A.         Interactions in a Community: Hypothesis 
We assume that players enter into a community voluntarily 
with an aim to do business, but they cannot predict who they will meet 
in the community. We will further assume that diverse players belong 
to the community.  To illustrate this assumption in a simpler form, let 
us assume that two players 1, and 2, belong to the community. Players, 
1 and 2, encounter each other by coincidence and create a relationship. 
The outcome of this relationship will depend on the players’ modes 
and external environment, assuming each player chose his mode prior 
to the encounter and that his mode cannot be changed. 
Innovations occur through players’ voluntary interactions. 
Such successful interactions which can bring about innovations 
requires that the mode of each player matches with others’ modes. If 
players’ modes do not match, their relationships will not function as 
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an ecosystem. In such a case, investment would be wasted without any 
return. Therefore, in Table 1, we assume a negative outcome if players’ 
modes do not match. Even if players’ modes match, benefits are 
smaller if their modes are not consistent with external circumstances. 
In Table 1, it is assumed that modes of two parties are [i] in an 
environment [i], benefits 30 could be produced to each player. If such 
a match occurs in an environment [j], benefits would be only 5. If their 
modes do not match, frictions occur and benefits would be -10. 
Equally, if their modes are [j] in an environment [j], benefits would be 
30, while benefits would be only 5, if their modes are [i]. 
Table 1: The pay-off matrixes of Players 1 and 2. 
  
 
 
 
Strictly speaking, differences of modes are more complex. Let’s 
assume that mode “i” represents a mode which is innovation oriented. 
We use [a] and [b] to illustrate two specific modes as variations of “i”. 
For example, mode [a] puts more emphasis on production process, 
while marketing is more important in mode [b]; even though both 
modes do not hesitate to take risks, mode [a] prefers ex ante 
investigation and planning, while in mode [b] ex post risk management 
is more important; certain types of conflicts of modes are small and 
can be resolved through players’ cooperative negotiations, but other 
types of conflicts of modes are so great that they need organizational 
reforms. In any case, such complexity is reflected in the size of 
transaction costs. 
external circumstance: j
2
1
5, 5 -10, -10
-10, -10 30, 30
mode i
mode j
mode i mode j
external circumstance: i
2
1
30, 30 -10, -10
-10, -10 5, 5
mode i
mode j
mode i mode j
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B.         The Role of Law in Promoting Innovation 
1. Traditionally recognized functions of law. – Even in a well-
functioning ecosystem where relationships among players are 
autonomously established, law plays a crucial role as an element of the 
external environment. 
First, law can be a tool to enhance each player’s individual 
capacity. In addition, educational and training schemes can be 
introduced from outside of the ecosystem by law. If each player’s 
knowledge, technique, and comprehension can be enhanced by these 
schemes, outcomes such as the figure 30 in Table 2 can be increased 
to fifty or one hundred. 
Second, contracts and properties can be protected by law. To 
achieve the outcomes in Table 2—either thirty or five—contracts and 
property rights must be protected. Some ecosystems can offer 
protective functions by its traditional customs or social norms. 
However, they have a few shortcomings compared to law: it is more 
difficult to enforce these non-law customs and norms than it is to 
enforce law; there is no guarantee that such customs and norms would 
be appropriately designed and applied; and it is more difficult to amend 
or abolish customs and norms than it is to abolish law. 
Third, law is necessary to develop and manage infrastructures, 
including financial systems, information systems, traffic systems, 
distribution systems, production systems, and legal systems, for 
innovations. These infrastructures improve the quality of each player’s 
activities, and the contents and frequency of innovations, by enlarging 
and facilitating players’ interactions. 
 These functions have traditionally been expected as the roles 
of law, and have been integrated into various policy measures. The 
important thing is to understand that the roles of law are not limited 
to these functions. 
2. Autonomous adjustment by ecosystem and its limits. – As stated 
above, conflicts of modes are fatal for innovations. If modes of players 
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do not match, modes can be adjusted by autonomous mechanisms in 
the ecosystem to which they belong. 
The simplest autonomous mechanism is named “cheap talk” 
in economic theory.16 Let’s take Table 1 again and assume that the 
external environment is [i]. If a player adopts mode [i], it is desirable 
that another player would also adopt mode [i]. In other words, both 
players want to cooperate, i.e., choose the same “mode,” if they know 
what the other player’s choice will be, but uncertainty about the other 
player’s choice will make such cooperation fail. Under such 
circumstances, the appropriate action for one player is to inform the 
other player of his choice of mode before the other player chooses his 
mode. Since both players wish to collaborate, they can trust that such 
notice is correct and the other player will take the same mode. 
Therefore, the desirable result, i.e., choice of mode [i] by both players 
in the environment [i], would occur through both parties’ voluntary 
actions. The problem, however, is that this situation does not often 
exist. 
Another useful mechanism to adjust modes is an “evolutionary 
process.” This mechanism assumes that each player will choose his 
“mode,” which might bring about greater benefits. Then the player will 
look at his mode or the mode of other players in a close circle. These 
players would learn a better mode-to bring about more benefits-and 
try to imitate it. Repeating trials to imitate and learn other modes would 
lead to a situation in which the more beneficial mode would become 
dominant in society. This mechanism does not require players to be 
rational or perfect usable information. A number of trials to learn 
others’ modes and imitate them would lead to specific modes 
becoming dominant in the society. 
Conditions of this mechanism, however, are not easy to fulfill. 
First, to learn or imitate a more beneficial mode (mode as objective), 
players should share the same learning mode or imitation mode (mode 
                                                 
 
16   See Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap Talk, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 
103 (1996). 
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as method). To observe, understand, obtain, and apply other players’ 
ways of thinking and behavioral patterns (mode) requires complex 
interactions between players on both the learning and teaching sides. 
If learning or imitation of others’ mode is difficult, the entire to-be-
evolutionary process may not evolve. Second, during the evolutionary 
process, the external environment should be stable. If the external 
environment changes, the evolutionary process will lose orientation. 
The external environment of innovations, however, often changes. 
Therefore, even if the evolutionary process evolves, it may not reach a 
desirable goal, i.e., to achieve expected benefits and create an 
ecosystem. 
We cannot simply assume that an ecosystem would 
autonomously function to resolve conflicts of modes among players 
and promote innovations. When conflicts of modes occur, an 
ecosystem may not function and innovations will not occur. We should 
not fully depend on the autonomous adjustment functions of an 
ecosystem, and may have to use mechanisms and powers outside the 
ecosystem. Here, we see the potential utility of law, although preceding 
analysis overlooked this aspect. 
C.         Mode and Law 
As we saw in Section A, there are three functions for which 
law has traditionally been performing in order to support the creation 
of an innovation ecosystem. However, we realized that the mode has 
been neglected and autonomous adjustment mechanism inherent in an 
ecosystem has limits. Here, we see a new role of law, i.e., adjustment 
of modes. This includes the following: First, law might encourage each 
player to change his mode before their encounter, which will prevent 
conflicts of modes in advance. This is unnecessary for players in the 
same region or industry; however, when private companies and 
authorities cooperate for innovations, or when small- or medium-size 
companies want to expand their business in foreign countries, 
adjustment of modes assisted by law might be necessary. In addition, 
when a special economic zone is created to promote innovations, 
modes of players should be adjusted prior to their involvement in the 
zone. Law can play a crucial role in facilitating such an adjustment. 
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Second, when players’ share the same mode [j], although the 
mode of external environment is [i],17 such equilibrium between players 
does not bring about an optimal outcome; however a player will not 
be incentivized to change his mode [j] as long as other players retain 
mode [j], since maintaining mode [j] would be his best choice. To 
depart from such equilibrium is more difficult as the number of players 
gets larger, but a more appropriate mode will be adopted in order to 
achieve more innovations. Law can play a crucial role in facilitating the 
change of mode. To identify a more desirable mode might be costly 
for players, but if the law can identify the mode at a lower cost or more 
effectively, players might be encouraged to change their mode. A good 
example which illustrates the change of mode is the Meiji Restoration 
in Japan at the end of the nineteenth century. After the feudal system, 
begun under Tokugawa Shogunate in the seventeenth century was 
collapsed, the new Meiji Government sought a model of a modern 
State. After a thorough investigation, the Meiji Government decided 
to introduce the system from Prussia, and modeled the Imperial 
Constitution of Japan as well as important basic laws after the Prussian 
system. 
Law can also synchronize the timing as a mode. For example, 
today’s academic calendar in Japan begins in April and ends in March 
of the following year, which we could describe as the April-March 
mode. This was not the case, however, until the early twentieth 
century. In 1886, the academic year of elementary schools was changed 
to follow the State’s fiscal year, which starts in April. The calendar of 
high schools was changed in 1919, and in 1921, when the academic 
calendar of universities was changed, all schools adopted the April-
March mode. This change affected not only the life style of people, but 
also business customs. Thus the April-March mode became the 
standard calendar mode of Japan and it affected various investments. 
                                                 
 
17   This could happen if, due to the change of external environment, the 
optimal match between the mode shared by players and modes of the external 
environment is lost.  
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Third, previous discussions on innovation ecosystem seem to 
only focus on success stories. However, as there are few Silicon Valley 
ecosystems in the world, it is important to also analyze the many failed 
cases. We should look at these cases through the lens of the functions 
of law to adjust different modes of players and environment and 
facilitate the creation of ecosystems. 
D.         Modes Beyond a Community 
Adjustment of modes in one community is relatively simple, 
and it is easier to understand how to solve conflicts of modes in one 
community. However, recent open-innovation and meta-national 
innovations imply interactions beyond one organization, one region, 
or one state. Today, it is necessary to solve conflicts of modes in a 
“beyond-one-community-context.” Law can serve this purpose. 
In an ecosystem, innovations can be achieved when the 
majority of the ecosystem’s members share the same mode. Within an 
ecosystem the unification of modes can be promoted. However, in 
order to develop innovations beyond an organization or a State, we 
will inevitably face various modes of diverse stakeholders and 
environments. Multiple ecosystems with different modes will co-exist. 
A key question for us is how to cultivate mutually beneficial 
interactions among these ecosystems. It is incorrect to assume that 
there is one universal mode to which all ecosystems should be oriented. 
Diversity of mode occurs because, first, an ecosystem tends to 
internalize modes which are adaptable to regional circumstances, and 
support by local policies accelerates this tendency.18 Second, if there 
can be several modes with equal desirability for innovations, the choice 
of mode to be shared in an ecosystem can be determined by 
coincidence. Therefore, two ecosystems facing the same external 
environment may choose different “modes,” and there would be plural 
equilibria. Third, sharing a mode is either path-dependent or history-
                                                 
 
18   This idea was proposed by Charles M. Tiebout. Charles M. Tiebout, A 
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
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dependent. When a mode has been shared in an ecosystem at a point 
in the past, investments would have been made presuming this mode 
would remain shared in the ecosystem. Through these investments, 
this mode would fit to innovation better. For example, if this mode is 
shared in a community in which individual investors (“angels”)19 
provide money to venture companies, various services to improve this 
mode would be developed, such as services to match angels and 
ventures; services to provide information to angels; services to support 
contracts between angels and ventures; and services to solve problems 
between angels and ventures. When these services are well-established, 
this mode is further strengthened.   
Hence, it should be assumed that the mode shared in one 
ecosystem is usually different from modes of other ecosystems. 
However, as we saw above, how to cope with conflicts of modes is the 
key for innovations. Law can play a crucial role in this context. Ex ante 
adjustment and ex post adjustment are two possible designs of law to 
cope with conflicts of modes. 
E.         Legal System for Ex Ante Adjustment 
Ex ante adjustment is inspired by the concept of uniform law; 
it establishes in advance a widely applicable mode and urges various 
players to adopt it. This approach can be further analyzed in detail: 
each community can retain its mode for internal interactions of players, 
but accept a widely applicable mode (mode [U]) for beyond-one-
community-interactions among players （Table 2）. Or, each 
community can force all players to adopt a universally applicable mode 
(mode [U]) （Table 3）.20 
                                                 
 
19   Individual investors who provide start-ups with capital for their 
business are called as ‘angels’. This term originally stems from those wealthy 
individuals who financially supported theatrical productions in Broadway which 
would have otherwise been shut down. 
20   In Japan, there is a good example of this model, i.e. JIS (Japanese 
Industrial Standards) based on Kōgyōhyōjunkahō [Industrial Standardization Law], 
Act No. 185 of 1949 (Japan). This law was enacted in 1949 with aims at unification 
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Table 2, Uniform-Law Approach I. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3, Uniform-Law Approach II. 
 
In Tables 2 and 3, we assume that benefits brought about by 
the shared mode [U] [12] are smaller than the biggest benefits in Table 
1 [30]. If benefits to be achieved by the mode [U] are bigger than [30], 
each community will voluntarily introduce this mode into their 
ecosystem, and it would be unnecessary to unify modes. However, if 
                                                 
 
of industrial products and related technologies, designs, manufactures and 
managements in Japan. This law established unified modes on industries in Japan 
and facilitated transactions beyond individual organizations or regions and let to the 
improvement of the quality of industrial products. If this model is valid in 
international context or not, is our concern.  
2
1
?, ? ?, ? -10, -10
?, ? ?, ? -10, -10
-10, -10 -10, -10 12, 12
mode i/U
mode U
mode i/U mode U
mode j/U
mode j/U
2
1
30, 30 -10, -10 -10, -10
-10, -10 5, 5 -10, -10
-10, -10 -10, -10 12, 12
mode i
mode U
mode i mode U
mode j
mode j
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
 
184 
 
the mode [U] would bring about less than [5], the introduction of the 
mode [U] would be meaningless. 
Table 3 illustrates that the modes applicable to intra-
community and inter-community interactions mode are clearly 
separable. In reality, however, such clear separation is questionable, 
since an ecosystem usually consists of complex interrelationships of 
various players that include intra-community and inter-community 
interactions. 
Unlike Table 2, Table 3 assumes that even if a policymaker 
forces an ecosystem to abandon its modes[i] or [j] and to apply the new 
mode [U], which does not necessarily match with their external 
environment. It is questionable whether a well-functioning ecosystem 
can easily abandon its original modes. Hence, applying a mode [U] that 
is applicable beyond a community would be difficult to implement. 
In addition, although in these Tables we assume that both 
players would equally obtain benefits [12] by applying a mode U, in 
reality, each player’s benefits are asymmetrical. Designing a mode and 
applying it would become a game among various players. Even if there 
is a mode [U] which could produce greater benefits as a whole, some 
players whose benefits would decrease by the mode [U] would oppose 
the mode. Such a power game would result in significant costs to 
societies, which could otherwise have been spent pursuing 
innovations. 
F.         Legal System for Ex Post Adjustment 
We support the ex post adjustment system as the more 
functional approach. This system would modify modes and external 
environment only after conflicts of modes are recognized and the 
external environment of concerned interactions is investigated（Table 
5）. Whether players’ modes would be modified or there would be an 
intervention into the external environment would be decided ex post. 
Modification of the external environment could also be made by law. 
Different from the ex-ante adjustment system, the ex post 
adjustment system does not aim at the ideal solution. Of particular 
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importance is that this system is functional and there are less hurdles 
to overcome when introducing it. First, the ex post adjustment system 
would intervene only in the case of conflicts of modes. If the 
interaction of players is well-functioning, no costs would occur. 
Second, costs to consider all possible scenarios in advance, to negotiate 
with concerned players or communities, to develop a unified desirable 
mode and to disseminate it to related players or communities, would 
not occur. Finally, the ex post adjustment system does not affect already 
shared modes in a relevant ecosystem. 
 
 
Table 4: Ex-post Adjustment approach.  
 
 
  
 
→  
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
To promote innovation, autonomous ecosystems in which 
various players are organically linked are crucial. Such ecosystems 
presume that specific mechanisms are shared among its closed 
membership. Introducing more open and universal mechanisms would 
hamper the original function of the ecosystem due to the conflicts of 
modes. Law would play a crucial role to adjust conflicts of modes 
between players and the environment, or among players. Under such 
conditions, we propose an ex post adjustment system by law. Such a 
system would enable both the maintenance of the diversity of the 
innovation ecosystem and, at the same time, the adjustment of 
interactions beyond one ecosystem. 
2
1
30, 30
i: 10, 2
j: 2, 10
i: 2, 10
j: 10, 2
5, 5
mode i
mode i
mode j
mode j
2
1
30, 30 -10, -10
-10, -10 5, 5
mode i
mode i
mode j
mode j
